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ABSTRACT
Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU
makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel
techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary data from mem-
ory. As state-of-the-art software mitigations for Meltdown may
incur significant performance overheads, they are only seen as a
temporary solution. Thus, software mitigations are disabled on
more recent processors, which are not susceptible to Meltdown
anymore.
In this paper, we show that Meltdown-like attacks are still possi-
ble on recent CPUs which are not vulnerable to the original Melt-
down attack. We show that the store buffer—a microarchitectural
optimization to reduce the latency for data stores—in combination
with the TLB enables powerful attacks. We present several ASLR-
related attacks, including a KASLR break from unprivileged appli-
cations, and breaking ASLR from JavaScript. We can also mount
side-channel attacks, breaking the atomicity of TSX, and monitor-
ing control flow of the kernel. Furthermore, when combined with
a simple Spectre gadget, we can leak arbitrary data from memory.
Our paper shows that Meltdown-like attacks are still possible, and
software fixes are still necessary to ensure proper isolation between
the kernel and user space.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Side-channel analysis and counter-
measures; Systems security; Operating systems security.
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Modern processors have numerous optimizations to achieve the
performance and efficiency that customers expect today. Most of
these optimizations, e.g., CPU caches, are transparent for software
developers and do not require changes in existing software. While
the instruction-set architecture (ISA) describes the interface be-
tween software and hardware, it is only an abstraction layer for
the CPUs microarchitecture. On the microarchitectural level, the
CPU can apply any performance optimization as long as it does
not violate the guarantees given by the ISA. Such optimizations
also include pipelining or speculative execution. As the microarchi-
tectural level is transparent and the optimizations are performed
automatically, such optimizations are usually not or only sparsely
documented. Furthermore, the main focus of microarchitectural
optimizations is performance and efficiency, resulting in fewer se-
curity considerations than on the architectural level.
In recent years, we have seen several attacks on the microar-
chitectural state of CPUs, making the internal state of the CPU
visible [13, 25, 62, 64, 85]. With knowledge about the internal CPU
state, it is possible to attack cryptographic algorithms [4, 39, 41, 54,
62, 64, 85], spy on user interactions [26, 52, 68], or covertly transmit
data [54, 57, 82, 83]. With the recent discovery of Meltdown [53],
Foreshadow [77], and Foreshadow-NG [80], microarchitectural at-
tacks advanced to a state where not only metadata but arbitrary
data can be leaked. These attacks exploit the property that many
CPUs still continue working out-of-order with data even if the
data triggered a fault when loading it, e.g., due to a failed privilege
check. Although the data is never architecturally visible, it can be
encoded into the microarchitectural state and made visible using
microarchitectural side-channel attacks.
While protecting against side-channel attacks was often seen
as the duty of developers [5, 41], Meltdown and Foreshadow-NG
showed that this is not always possible. These vulnerabilities, which
are present in most Intel CPUs, break the hardware-enforced iso-
lation between untrusted user applications and the trusted kernel.
Hence, these attacks allow an attacker to read arbitrary memory,
against which a single application cannot protect itself.
As these CPU vulnerabilities are deeply rooted in the CPU, close
to or in the critical path, they cannot be fixed with microcode up-
dates, but the issue is fixed on more recent processors [11, 37, 38].
Due to the severity of these vulnerabilities, and the ease to exploit
them, all major operating systems rolled out software mitigations to
prevent exploitation of Meltdown [14, 19, 28, 44]. The software mit-
igations are based on the idea of separating user and kernel space
in stricter ways [22]. While such a stricter separation does not
only prevent Meltdown, it also prevents other microarchitectural
attacks on the kernel [22], e.g., microarchitectural KASLR (kernel
address-space layout randomization) breaks [24, 33, 43]. Still, soft-
ware mitigations may incur significant performance overheads,
especially for workloads that require frequent switching between
kernel and user space [19]. Thus, CPU manufacturers solved the
root issue directly in hardware, making the software mitigations
obsolete.
Although new CPUs are not vulnerable to the original Meltdown
attack, we show that similar Meltdown-like effects can still be
observed on such CPUs. In this paper, we investigate the store
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buffer and its microarchitectural side effects. The store buffer is a
microarchitectural element which serializes the stream of stores and
hides the latency when storing values to memory. It works similarly
to a queue, completing all memory stores asynchronously while
allowing the CPU to continue executing the execution stream out of
order. To guarantee the consistency of subsequent load operations,
load operations have to first check the store buffer for pending
stores to the same address. If there is a store-buffer entry with a
matching address, the load is served from the store buffer. This
so-called store-to-load forwarding has been exploited in Spectre
v4 [32], where the load and store go to different virtual addresses
mapping the same memory location. Consequently, the virtual
address of the load is not found in the store buffer and a stale value
is read from the caches or memory instead. However, due to the
asynchronous nature of the store buffer, Meltdown-like effects are
visible, as store-to-load forwarding also happens after an illegal
memory store.
We focus on correct store-to-load forwarding, i.e., no positive
or negative mismatches. We present three basic attack techniques
that each leak side-channel information from correct store-to-load
forwarding. First, Data Bounce, which exploits that stores to mem-
ory are forwarded even if the target address of the store is inac-
cessible to the user, e.g., kernel addresses. With Data Bounce we
break KASLR, reveal the address space of Intel SGX enclaves, and
even break ASLR from JavaScript. Second, Fetch+Bounce, which
combines Data Bounce with the TLB side channel. With Fetch+
Bounce we monitor kernel activity on a page-level granularity.
Third, Speculative Fetch+Bounce, which combines Fetch+Bounce
with speculative execution, leading to arbitrary data leakage from
memory. Speculative Fetch+Bounce does not require shared mem-
ory between the user space and the kernel [46], and the leaked data
is not encoded in the cache. Hence, Speculative Fetch+Bounce even
works with countermeasures in place which only prevent cache
covert channels.
We conclude that the hardware fixes for Meltdown are not suf-
ficient on new CPUs. We stress that due to microarchitectural op-
timizations, security guarantees for isolating the user space from
kernel space are not as strong as they should be. Therefore, we high-
light the importance of keeping the already deployed additional
software-based isolation of user and kernel space [22].
Contributions. The contributions of this work are:
(1) We discover a Meltdown-like effect around the store buffer
on Intel CPUs (Data Bounce).
(2) We present Fetch+Bounce, a side-channel attack leveraging
the store buffer and the TLB.
(3) We present a KASLR break, and an ASLR break from both
JavaScript and SGX, and a covert channel.
(4) We show that an attacker can still leak kernel data even on
CPUs where Meltdown is fixed (Speculative Fetch+Bounce).
Outline. Section 2 provides background on transient execution at-
tacks.We describe the basic effects and attack primitives in Section 3.
We present KASLR, and ASLR breaks with Data Bounce in Section 4.
We show how control flow can be leaked with Fetch+Bounce in
Section 5. We demonstrate how Speculative Fetch+Bounce allows
leaking kernel memory on fully patched hardware and software in
Section 6. We discuss the context of our attack and related work in
Section 7. We conclude in Section 8.
Responsible Disclosure. We responsibly disclosed our initial re-
search to Intel on January 18, 2019. Intel verified our findings. The
findings were part of an embargo ending on May 14, 2019.
2 BACKGROUND
In this section, we describe the background required for this paper.
We give a brief overview of caches, transient execution and transient
execution attacks, store buffers, virtual memory, and Intel SGX.
2.1 Cache Attacks
Processor speeds increased massively over the past decades. While
the bandwidth of modern main memory (DRAM) has increased
accordingly, the latency has not decreased to the same extent. Con-
sequently, it is essential for the processor to fetch data from DRAM
ahead of time and buffer it in faster internal storage. For this pur-
pose, processors contain small memory buffers, called caches, that
store frequently or recently accessed data. In modern processors,
the cache is organized in a hierarchy of multiple levels, with the low-
est level being the smallest but also the fastest. In each subsequent
level, the size and access time increases.
As caches are used to hide the latency of memory accesses,
they inherently introduce a timing side channel. Many different
cache attack techniques have been proposed over the past two
decades [5, 25, 47, 62, 85]. Today, the most important techniques
are Prime+Probe [62, 64] and Flush+Reload [85]. Variants of these
attacks that are used today exploit that the last-level cache is shared
and inclusive on many processors. Prime+Probe attacks constantly
measure how long it takes to fill an entire cache set. Whenever
a victim process accesses a cache line in this cache set, the mea-
sured time will be slightly higher. In a Flush+Reload attack, the
attacker constantly flushes the targeted memory location using
the clflush instruction. The attacker then measures how long it
takes to reload the data. Based on the reload time the attacker de-
termines whether a victim has accessed the data in the meantime.
Due to its fine granularity, Flush+Reload has been used for attacks
on various computations, e.g., web server function calls [87], user
input [26, 52, 68], kernel addressing information [24], and crypto-
graphic algorithms [4, 41, 85].
Covert channels are a particular use case of side channels. In
this scenario, the attacker controls both the sender and the receiver
and tries to leak information from one security domain to another,
bypassing isolation imposed on the functional or the system level.
Flush+Reload as well as Prime+Probe have both been used in high-
performance covert channels [25, 54, 57].
2.2 Transient-execution Attacks
Modern processors are highly complex and large systems. Program
code has a strict in-order instruction stream. However, if the pro-
cessor would process this instruction stream strictly in order, the
processor would have to stall until all operands of the current in-
struction are available, even though subsequent instructions might
be ready to run. To optimize this case, modern processors first fetch
and decode an instruction in the frontend. In many cases, instruc-
tions are split up into smaller micro-operations (µOPs) [15]. These
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µOPs are then placed in the so-called Re-Order Buffer (ROB). µOPs
that have operands also need storage space for these operands.
When a µOP is placed in the ROB, this storage space is dynamically
allocated from the load buffer, for memory loads, the store buffer,
for memory stores, and the register file, for register operations. The
ROB entry only references the load buffer and store buffer entries.
While the operands of a µOP still might not be available after it
was placed in the ROB, we can now schedule subsequent µOPs
in the meantime. When a µOP is ready to be executed, the sched-
uler schedules them for execution. The results of the execution are
placed in the corresponding registers, load buffer entries, or store
buffer entries. When the next µOP in order is marked as finished,
it is retired, and the buffered results are committed and become
architectural.
As software is rarely purely linear, the processor has to either
stall execution until a (conditional) branch is resolved or specu-
late on the most likely outcome and start executing along the pre-
dicted path. The results of those predicted instructions are placed
in the ROB until the prediction has been verified. In the case where
the prediction was correct, the instructions are retired in order. If
the prediction was wrong, the processor reverts all architectural
changes, flushes the pipeline and the ROB but does not revert any
microarchitectural state changes, i.e., loading data into the cache
or TLB. Similarly, when an interrupt occurs, operations already
executed out of order must be flushed from the ROB. We refer
to instructions that have been executed speculatively or out-of-
order but were never committed as transient instructions [8, 46, 53].
Spectre-type attacks [8, 9, 32, 45, 46, 48, 56] exploit the transient
execution of instructions before the misprediction by one of the
processor’s prediction mechanisms is discovered. Meltdown-type
attacks [3, 8, 37, 38, 45, 53, 73, 77, 80] exploit the transient execution
of instructions before an interrupt or fault is handled.
2.3 Store Buffer
To interact with the memory subsystem (and also to hide some
of the latency), modern CPUs have store and load buffers (also
called memory order buffer [42]) which act as a queue. The basic
mechanism is that the load buffer contains requests for data fetches
from memory, while the store buffer contains requests for data
writes to memory.
As long as the store buffer is not exhausted, memory stores
are simply enqueued to the store buffer in the order they appear
in the execution stream, i.e., directly linked to a ROB entry. This
allows the CPU to continue executing instructions from the current
execution stream, without having to wait for the actual write to
finish. This optimization makes sense, as writes in many cases do
not influence subsequent instructions, i.e., only loads to the same
address are affected. Meanwhile, the store buffer asynchronously
processes the stores, ensuring that the stores are written to memory.
Thus, the store buffer avoids that the CPU has to stall while waiting
for the memory subsystem to finish the write. At the same time,
it guarantees that writes reach the memory subsystem in order,
despite out-of-order execution. Figure 1 illustrates the role of the
store buffer, as a queue between the store-data execution unit and
the memory subsystem, i.e., the L1 data cache.
Store Data
Load Data Load Buffer
Store Buffer L1
Data
Cache
Store-to-load forwarding
Execution Unit Memory Subsystem
Figure 1: A store operation stores the data in the store buffer
before it is written to the L1 data cache. Subsequent loads
can be satisfied from the store buffer if the data is not yet in
the L1 data cache. This is called store-to-load forwarding.
For every store operation that is added to the ROB, an entry is
allocated in the store buffer. This entry requires both the virtual
and physical address of the target. Only if there is no free entry
in the store buffer, the frontend stalls until there is an empty slot
available in the store buffer again [36]. Otherwise, the CPU can
immediately continue adding subsequent instructions to the ROB
and execute them out of order. On Intel CPUs, the store buffer has
up to 56 entries [36].
According to Intel patents, the store buffer consists of two sepa-
rate buffers: the Store Address Buffer and the Store Data Buffer [1, 2].
The store instruction is decoded into two µOPs, one for storing
the address and one for storing data. Those two instructions can
execute in either order, depending on which is ready first.
Although the store buffer hides the latency of stores, it also
increases the complexity of loads. Every load has to search the
store buffer for pending stores to the same address in parallel to the
regular L1 lookup. If the address of a load matches the address of a
preceding store, the value can be directly used from the store-buffer
entry. This optimization for subsequent loads is called store-to-load
forwarding [31].
Depending on the implementation of the store buffer, there are
various ways of implementing such a search required for store-to-
load forwarding, e.g., using content-addressable memory [81]. As
loads and stores on x86 do not have to be aligned, a load can also
be a partial match of a preceding store. Such a load with a partial
match of a store-buffer entry can either stall, continue with stale
data, or be resolved by the CPU by combining values from the store
buffer and the memory [81].
Moreover, to speed up execution, the CPUmight wrongly predict
that values should be fetched from memory although there was a
previous store, but the target of the previous store is not yet resolved.
As a result, the processor can continue transient execution with
wrong values, i.e., stale values from memory instead of the recently
stored value. This type of misprediction was exploited in Spectre
v4 (Speculative Store Bypass) [32], also named Spectre-STL [8].
To speed up store-to-load forwarding, the processor might specu-
late that a load matches the address of a subsequent store if only the
least significant 12 bits match [81]. This performance optimization
can further reduce the latency of loads, but also leaks information
across hyperthreads [74]. Furthermore, a similar effect also exists
if the least significant 20 bits match [42].
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2.4 Address Translation
Memory isolation is the basis of modern operating system security.
For this purpose, processors support virtual memory as an abstrac-
tion and isolation mechanism. Processes work on virtual addresses
instead of physical addresses and can architecturally not interfere
with each other unintentionally, as the virtual address spaces are
largely non-overlapping. The processor translates virtual addresses
to physical addresses through a multi-level page translation table.
The location of the translation table is indicated by a dedicated
register, e.g., CR3 on Intel architectures. The operating system up-
dates the register upon context switch with the physical address of
the top-level translation table of the next process. The translation
table entries keep track of various properties of the virtual memory
region, e.g., user-accessible, read-only, non-executable, and present.
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB). The translation of a vir-
tual to a physical address is time-consuming as the translation tables
are stored in physical memory. On modern processors, the transla-
tion is required even for L1 cache accesses. Hence, the translation
must be faster than the full L1 access, e.g., 4 cycles on recent Intel
processors. Caching translation tables in regular data caches [35]
is not sufficient. Therefore, processors have smaller special caches,
translation-lookaside buffers (TLBs) to cache page table entries.
2.5 Address Space Layout Randomization
To exploit a memory corruption bug, an attacker often requires
knowledge of addresses of specific data. To impede such attacks, dif-
ferent techniques like address space layout randomization (ASLR),
non-executable stacks, and stack canaries have been developed.
KASLR extends ASLR to the kernel, randomizing the offsets where
code, data, drivers, and other mappings are located on every boot.
The attacker then has to guess the location of (kernel) data struc-
tures, making attacks harder.
The double page fault attack by Hund et al. [33] breaks KASLR.
An unprivileged attacker accesses a kernel memory location and
triggers a page fault. The operating system handles the page fault
interrupt and hands control back to an error handler in the user
program. The attacker now measures how much time passed since
triggering the page fault. Even though the kernel address is inac-
cessible to the user, the address translation entries are copied into
the TLB. The attacker now repeats the attack steps, measuring the
execution time of a second page fault to the same address. If the
memory location is valid, the handling of the second page fault will
take less time as the translation is cached in the TLB. Thus, the
attacker learns whether a memory location is valid even though
the address is inaccessible to user space.
The same effect has been exploited by Jang et al. [43] in com-
bination with Intel TSX. Intel TSX extends the x86 instruction set
with support for hardware transactional memory via so-called TSX
transactions. A TSX transaction is aborted without any operating
system interaction if a page fault occurs within it. This reduces the
noise in the timing differences that was present in the attack by
Hund et al. [33] as the page fault handling of the operating system
is skipped. Thus, the attacker learns whether a kernel memory
location is valid with almost no noise at all.
Application Trusted enclave
Ca
ll
Ga
te
Untrusted
Load Enclave
Call Trusted Fnc.
...
Trusted Code
Return
Figure 2: In the SGX model, applications consist of an un-
trusted host application and a trusted enclave. The hardware
prevents any direct access to the enclave code or data. The
untrusted part uses the EENTER instruction to call enclave
functions that are exposed by the enclave.
The prefetch side channel presented by Gruss et al. [24] exploits
the software prefetch instruction. The execution time of the instruc-
tion is dependent on the translation cache that holds the right entry.
Thus, the attacker not only learns whether an inaccessible address
is valid but also the corresponding page size.
2.6 Intel SGX
As computer usage has changed over the past decades, the need for
a protected and trusted execution mechanism has developed. To
protect trusted code, Intel introduced an instruction-set extension
starting with the Skylake microarchitecture, called Software Guard
Extension (SGX) [35]. SGX splits applications into two code parts,
a trusted and an untrusted part. The trusted part is executed within
a hardware-backed enclave. The processor guarantees that mem-
ory belonging to the enclave cannot be accessed by anyone except
the enclave itself, not even the operating system. The memory is
encrypted and, thus, also cannot be read directly from the DRAM
module. Beyond this, there is no virtual memory isolation between
trusted and untrusted part. Consequently, the threat model of SGX
assumes that the operating system, other applications, and even
the remaining hardware might be compromised or malicious. How-
ever, memory-safety violations [49], race conditions [79], or side
channels [7, 72] are considered out of scope.
The untrusted part can only enter the enclave through a defined
interface which is conceptually similar to system calls. After the
trusted execution, the result of the computation, as well as the
control flow, is handed back to the calling application. The process
of invoking a trusted enclave function is illustrated in Figure 2. To
enable out-of-the-box data sharing capabilities, the enclave has full
access to the entire address space of the host. As this protection is
not symmetric, it gives rise to enclave malware [71].
3 ATTACK PRIMITIVES
In this section, we introduce the three basic mechanisms for our
attacks. First, Data Bounce, which exploits that stores to memory
are forwarded even if the target address of the store is inaccessible
to the user. We use Data Bounce to break both user and kernel space
ASLR (cf. Section 4). Second, we exploit interactions between Data
Bounce and the TLB in Fetch+Bounce. Fetch+Bounce enables attacks
on the kernel on a page-level granularity, similar to controlled-
channel attacks [84], page-cache attacks [20], TLBleed [16], and
DRAMA [65] (cf. Section 5). Third, we augment Fetch+Bounce with
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1 mov (0) → $dummy
2 mov $x → (p)
3 mov (p) → $value
4 mov ($mem + $value * 4096) → $dummy
Figure 3: Data Bounce writes a known value to an accessible
or inaccessible memory location, reads it back, encodes it
into the cache, and finally recovers the value using a Flush+
Reload attack. If the recovered value matches the known
value, the address is backed by a physical page.
speculative execution in Speculative Fetch+Bounce. Speculative
Fetch+Bounce leads to arbitrary data leakage from memory (cf.
Section 6).
As described in Section 2.3, unsuccessful or incorrect address
matching in the store-to-load forwarding implementation can en-
able different attacks. For our attacks, we focus solely on the case
where the address matching in the store-to-load forwarding im-
plementation is successful and correct. We exploit store-to-load
forwarding in the case where the address of the store and load
are exactly the same, i.e., we do not rely on any misprediction or
aliasing effects.
3.1 Data Bounce
Our first attack primitive, Data Bounce, exploits the property of
the store buffer that the full physical address is required for a valid
entry. Although the store-buffer entry is already reserved in the
ROB, the actual store can only be forwarded if the virtual and
physical address of the store target are known [36].
Thus, stores can only be forwarded if the physical address of the
store target can be resolved. As a consequence, virtual addresses
without a valid mapping to physical addresses cannot be forwarded
to subsequent loads. The basic idea of Data Bounce is to check
whether a data write is forwarded to a data load from the same
address. If the store-to-load forwarding is successful for a chosen
address, we know that the chosen address can be resolved to a
physical address. If done naïvely, such a test would destroy the
currently stored value at the chosen address due to the write if the
address is writable. Thus, we only test the store-to-load forwarding
for an address in the transient-execution domain, i.e., the write is
never committed architecturally.
Figure 3 illustrates the basic principle of Data Bounce. First, we
start transient execution. The easiest way is by generating a fault
( 1 ) and catching it (e.g., with a signal handler) or suppressing
it (e.g., using Intel TSX). Alternatively, transient execution can
be induced through speculative execution using a misspeculated
branch [46], call [46], or return [48, 56]. For a chosen address p, we
store any chosen value x using a simple data store operation ( 2 ).
Subsequently, we read the value stored at address p ( 3 ) and encode
it in the cache ( 4 ) in the same way as with Meltdown [53]. That
is, depending on the value read from p, we access a different page
of the contiguous memorymem, resulting in the respective page
being cached. Using a straightforward Flush+Reload attack on the
256 pages ofmem, the page with the lowest access time (i.e., the
cached page) directly reveals the value read from p.
We can then distinguish two different cases as follows.
Store-to-load forwarding. If the value read from p is x , i.e., , the
x-th page ofmem is cached, the store was forwarded to the
load. Thus, we know that p is backed by a physical page. The
choice of the value x is of no importance for Data Bounce.
Even in the unlikely case that p already contains the value x
and the CPU reads the stale value from memory instead of
the previously stored value x , we still know that p is backed
by a physical page.
No store-to-load forwarding. If no page ofmem is cached, the
store was not forwarded to the subsequent load. This can
have either a temporary reason or a permanent reason. If the
virtual address is not backed by a physical page, the store-
to-load forwarding always fails, i.e., even retrying the exper-
iment will not be successful. Different reasons to not read
the written value back are, e.g., interrupts (context switches,
hardware interrupts) or errors in distinguishing cache hits
from cache misses (e.g., due to power scaling). However, we
found that if Data Bounce fails multiple times when repeated
for addr , it is almost certain that addr is not backed by a
physical page.
In summary, if a value “bounces back” from a virtual address, the
virtual address must be backed by a physical page. This effect can be
exploited within the virtual address space of a process, e.g., to break
ASLR in a sandbox (cf. Section 4.3). On CPUs where Meltdown is
mitigated in hardware, KAISER [22] is not enabled, and the kernel
is again mapped in user space [11]. In this case, we can also apply
Data Bounce to kernel addresses. Even though we cannot access
the data stored at the kernel address, we are still able to detect
whether a particular kernel address is backed by a physical page.
Thus, Data Bounce can still be used to break KASLR (cf. Section 4.1)
on processors with in-silicon patches against Meltdown.
3.2 Fetch+Bounce
Our second attack primitive, Fetch+Bounce, augments Data Bounce
with an additional interaction effect of the TLB and the store buffer.
With this combination, it is also possible to detect the recent usage
of physical pages.
Data Bounce is a very reliable side channel, making it is easy
to distinguish valid from invalid addresses, i.e., whether a virtual
page is backed by a physical page. Additionally, the success rate
(i.e., how often Data Bounce has to be repeated) for valid addresses
directly depends on which translations are stored in the TLB. With
Fetch+Bounce, we further exploit this TLB-related side-channel
information by analyzing the success rate of Data Bounce.
The store buffer requires the physical address of the store target
(cf. Section 2.3). If the translation from virtual to physical address for
the target address is not cached in the TLB, the store triggers a page-
table walk to resolve the physical address. On our test machines,
we observed that in this case the store-to-load forwarding fails
once, i.e., as the physical address of the store is not known, it is
not forwarded to the subsequent load. In the other case, when the
physical address is already known to the TLB, the store-to-load
forwarding succeeds immediately.
With Fetch+Bounce, we exploit that Data Bounce succeeds im-
mediately if the mapping for this address is already cached in the
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1 for retry = 0...2
mov $x → (p)
2 mov (p) → $value
mov ($mem + $value * 4096) → $dummy
3 if flush_reload($mem + $x * 4096) then break
Figure 4: Fetch+Bounce repeatedly executes Data Bounce. If
Data Bounce is successful on the first try, the address is in
the TLB. If it succeeds on the second try, the address is valid
but not in the TLB.
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Figure 5:Mounting Fetch+Bounce on a virtualmemory range
allows to clearly distinguish mapped from unmapped ad-
dresses. Furthermore, for every page, it allows to distinguish
whether the address translation is cached in the TLB.
TLB. Figure 4 shows how Fetch+Bounce works. The basic idea is to
repeat Data Bounce ( 2 ) multiple times ( 1 ). There are 3 possible
scenarios, which are also illustrated in Figure 5.
TLB Hit. If the address of the store is in the TLB, Data Bounce
succeeds immediately, and the loop is aborted ( 3 ). Thus,
retry is 0 after the loop.
TLB Miss. If the address of the store is not in the TLB,Data Bounce
fails in the first attempt, as the physical address needs to
be resolved before store-to-load forwarding. However, in
this case, Data Bounce succeeds in the second attempt (i.e., ,
retry is 1).
Invalid Address. If the address is invalid, retry is larger than
1. As only valid address are stored in the TLB [43], and
the store buffer requires a valid physical address, store-to-
load forwarding can never succeed. The higher retry, the
(exponentially) more confidence is gained that the address
is indeed not valid.
AsData Bounce can be used on inaccessible addresses (e.g., kernel
addresses), this also works for Fetch+Bounce. Hence, with Fetch+
Bounce it is possible to deduce for any virtual address whether it is
currently cached in the TLB. The only requirement for the virtual
address is that it is mapped to the attacker’s address space.
Fetch+Bounce is not limited to the data TLB (dTLB), but can
also leak information from the instruction TLB (iTLB). Thus, in
addition to recent data accesses, it is also possible to detect which
code pages have been executed recently. Again, this also works for
inaccessible addresses, e.g., kernel memory.
Moreover, Fetch+Bounce cannot only be used to check whether
a (possibly) inaccessible address is in the TLB but also force such
an address into the TLB. While this effect might be exploitable on
its own, we do not further investigate this side effect. For a real-
world attack (cf. Section 5) this is an undesired side effect, as every
256 pages kernel memory (kernel)
⋯
if (x < len(array))
y = kernel[array[x] * 4096]
Store in TLB
TLB
Hit
Fetch+Bounce
Kernel
User
Figure 6: Speculative Fetch+Bounce allows an attacker to use
Spectre gadgets to leak data from the kernel, by encoding
them in the TLB. The advantage over regular Spectre attacks
is that no shared memory is required, gadgets are simpler
as an attacker does not require control of the array base ad-
dress but only over x. All cache-based countermeasures are
circumvented.
measurement with Fetch+Bounce destroys the information. Thus,
to repeat Fetch+Bounce for one address, we must evict the TLB in
between, e.g., using the strategy proposed by Gras et al. [16].
3.3 Speculative Fetch+Bounce
Our third attack primitive, Speculative Fetch+Bounce, augments
Fetch+Bounce with transient-execution side effects on the TLB. The
TLB is also updated during transient execution [70]. That is, we
can even observe transient memory accesses with Fetch+Bounce.
As a consequence, Speculative Fetch+Bounce is a novel way to
exploit Spectre. Instead of using the cache as a covert channel in a
Spectre attack, we leverage the TLB to encode the leaked data. The
advantage of Speculative Fetch+Bounce over the original Spectre
attack is that there is no requirement for shared memory between
user and kernel space. The attacker only needs control over x to
leak arbitrary memory contents from the kernel. Figure 6 illustrates
the encoding of the data, which is similar to the original Spectre
attack [46]. Depending on the value of the byte to leak, we access
one out of 256 pages. Then, Fetch+Bounce is used to detect which
of the pages has a valid translation cached in the TLB. The cached
TLB entry directly reveals the leaked byte.
3.4 Performance and Accuracy
All of the 3 attack primitives work on a page-level granularity, i.e.,
4 kB. This limit is imposed by the underlying architecture, as virtual-
to-physical mappings can only be specified at page granularity.
Consequently, TLB entries also have a page granularity. Hence,
the spatial accuracy is the 4 kB page size, which is the same on all
CPUs.
While the spatial accuracy is always the same, the temporal accu-
racy varies between microarchitectures and implementations. On
the i9-9900K, we measured the time of Data Bounce over 1 000 000
repetitions and it takes on average 560 cycles per execution. In this
implementation, we use Intel TSX to suppress the exception. When
resorting to a signal handler for catching exceptions instead of Intel
TSX, one execution of Data Bounce takes on average 2300 cycles.
Fetch+Bounce and Speculative Fetch+Bounce do not require any
additional active part in the attack. They execute Data Bounce 3
times, thus the execution time is exactly three times higher than
the execution time of Data Bounce.
Store-to-Leak Forwarding
Table 1: Environments where we evaluated Data Bounce,
Fetch+Bounce, and Speculative Fetch+Bounce.
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Lab Pentium 4 531 ✓ ✗ ✗
Lab i5-3230M ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i7-4790 ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i7-6600U ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i7-6700K ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i7-8565U ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i7-8650U ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab i9-9900K ✓ ✓ ✓
Lab E5-1630 v4 ✓ ✓ ✓
Cloud E5-2650 v4 ✓ ✓ ✓
Data Bounce has the huge advantage that there are no false posi-
tives. Store-to-load forwarding does not work for invalid addresses.
Additionally, Flush+Reload when applied to individual pages does
not have false positives, as the prefetcher on Intel CPUs cannot
cross page boundaries [35]. Thus, if a virtual address is not backed
by a physical page, Data Bounce never reports this page as mapped.
The number of false negatives reported by Data Bounce is also
negligible. We do not exploit any race condition [53, 77] or aliasing
effects [74] but rather a missing permission check. Hence, the store-
to-load forwarding works reliably as expected [81]. This can also
be seen in the real-world attacks (cf. Section 4), where the F1-score,
i.e., the harmonic average of precision and recall, is almost always
perfect. We can conclude that Data Bounce is a highly practical
side-channel attack with perfect precision and recall.
3.5 Environments
We evaluated Data Bounce, Fetch+Bounce, and Speculative Fetch+
Bounce on multiple Intel CPUs. All attack primitives worked on all
tested CPUs, which range from the Ivy Bridge microarchitecture
(released 2012) to Whiskey Lake and Coffe Leak R (both released
end of 2018). Data Bounce even works on Pentium 4 Prescott CPUs
(released 2004). Table 1 contains the complete list of CPUs we used
to evaluate the attacks.
The primitives are not limited to the Intel Core microarchitecture,
but also work on the Intel Xeon microarchitecture. Thus, these
attacks are not limited to consumer devices, but can also be used in
the cloud. Furthermore, the attack primitives even work on CPUs
which have silicon fixes for Meltdown and Foreshadow, such as the
i7-8565U and i9-9900K [11].
For AMD, and ARM CPUs, we were not able to reproduce any
of our attack primitives, limiting the attacks to Intel CPUs.
4 ATTACKS ON ASLR
In this section, we evaluate our attack on ASLR in different scenar-
ios. As Data Bounce can reliably detect whether a virtual address is
backed by a physical page, it is well suited for breaking all kinds of
ASLR. In Section 4.1, we show that Data Bounce is the fastest way
and most reliable side-channel attack to break KASLR on Linux,
and Windows, both in native environments as well as in virtual ma-
chines. In Section 4.2, we demonstrate that Data Bounce also works
from within SGX enclaves, allowing enclaves to de-randomize the
host application. In Section 4.3, we describe that Data Bounce can
even be mounted from JavaScript to break ASLR of the browser.
4.1 Breaking KASLR
In this section, we show that Data Bounce can reliably break KASLR.
We evaluate the performance of Data Bounce in three different
KASLR breaking attacks. First, we de-randomize the kernel base
address. Second, we de-randomize the direct-physical map. Third,
we find and classify modules based on detected size.
De-randomizing the Kernel Base Address. Jang et al. [43]
state that the kernel text segment is mapped at a 16MB boundary
somewhere in the 0xffffffff80000000 - 0xffffffffc0000000
range. Given that range, the maximum kernel size is 1GB. Com-
bined with the 16MB alignment, the kernel can only be mapped
at one of 64 possible offsets, i.e., 6 bits of entropy. This contradicts
the official documentation in The Linux Kernel Archive [50], which
states that the kernel text segment is mapped somewhere in the
0xffffffff80000000 - 0xffffffff9fffffff range, giving us a
maximum size of 512MB. Our experiments show that Jang et al.
[43] is correct with the address range, but that the kernel is aligned
at a 8 times finer 2MB boundary. We verified this by checking
/proc/kallsyms after multiple reboots. With a kernel base address
range of 1GB and a 2MB alignment, we get 9 bits of entropy, al-
lowing the kernel to be placed at one of 512 possible offsets.
Using Data Bounce, we now start at the lower end of the ad-
dress range and test all of the 512 possible offsets. If the kernel is
mapped at a tested location, we will observe a cache hit. In our
experiments, we see the first cache hit at exactly the same address
given by /proc/kallsyms. Additionally, we see cache hits on all
2MB aligned pages that follow. This indicates a 1MB aliasing effect,
supporting the claim made by Islam et al. [42]. We only observe the
hit on 2MB aligned pages that follow, as this is our step size.
Table 2 shows the performance ofData Bounce in de-randomizing
kernel ASLR. We evaluated our attack on both an Intel Skylake i7-
6600U (without KPTI) and a new Intel Coffee Lake i9-9900K that
already includes fixes for Meltdown [53] and Foreshadow [77]. We
evaluated our attack on bothWindows and Linux, achieving similar
results although the ranges differ on Windows. On Windows, the
kernel also starts at a 2MB boundary, but the possible range is
0xfffff80000000000 - 0xfffff80400000000, which leads to 8192
possible offsets, i.e., 13 bits of entropy [43].
For the evaluation, we tested 10 different randomizations (i.e., 10
reboots), each one 100 times, giving us 1000 samples. For evaluating
the effectiveness of our attack, we use the F1-score. On the i7-6600U
and the i9-9900K, the F1-score for finding the kernel ASLR offset is
1 when testing every offset a single time, indicating that we always
find the correct offset. In terms of performance, we outperform the
previous state of the art [43] even though we have an 8 times larger
search space. Furthermore, to evaluate the performance on a larger
scale, we tested a single offset 100 million times. In that test, the
F1-score was 0.9996, showing that Data Bounce virtually always
works. The few misses that we observe are possibly due to the store
buffer being drained or that our test program was interrupted.
De-randomizing the Direct-physical Map. In Section 2.5, we
discussed that the Linux kernel has a direct-physical map that maps
Schwarz et al.
Table 2: Evaluation ofData Bounce in finding the kernel base
address and direct-physical map, and kernel modules. Num-
ber of retries refers to the maximum number of times an
offset is tested and number of offsets denotes the maximum
number of offsets that need to be tried.
Processor
Target #Retries #Offsets Time F1-Score
Skylake (i7-6600U)
base 1 512 72 µs 1
direct-physical 3 64000 13.648ms 1
module 32 262144 1.713 s 0.98
Coffee Lake (i9-9900K)
base 1 512 42 µs 1
direct-physical 3 64000 8.61ms 1
module 32 262144 1.33 s 0.96
the entire physical memory into the kernel virtual address space. To
impede attacks that require knowledge about the map placement
in memory, the map is placed at a random offset within a given
range at every boot. According to The Linux Kernel Archive [50],
the address range reserved for the map is 0xffff888000000000-
0xffffc87fffffffff, i.e., a 64 TB region. The Linux kernel source
code indicates that the map is aligned to a 1GB boundary. This
gives us 216 possible locations.
Using this information, we now use Data Bounce to recover the
location of the direct-physical map. Table 2 shows the performance
of the recovery process. For the evaluation, we tested 10 different
randomizations of the kernel (i.e., 10 reboots) and for each offset,
we repeated the detection 100 times. On the Skylake i7-6600U, we
were able to recover the offset in under 14ms if KPTI is disabled.
On the Coffee Lake i9-9900K, where KPTI is no longer needed, we
were able to do it in under 9ms.
Finding andClassifyingKernelModules. The kernel reserves
1GB for modules and loads them at 4 kB-aligned offset. In a first
step, we can use Data Bounce to detect the location of modules
by iterating over the search space in 4 kB steps. As kernel code is
always present and modules are separated by unmapped addresses,
we can detect where a module starts and ends. In a second step,
we use this information to estimate the size of all loaded kernel
modules. The world-readable /proc/modules file contains informa-
tion on modules, including name, size, number of loaded instances,
dependencies on other modules, and load state. For privileged users,
it additionally provides the address of the module. We correlate the
size from /proc/modules with the data from our Data Bounce attack
and can identify all modules with a unique size. On the i7-6600U,
running Ubuntu 18.04 with kernel version 4.15.0-47, we have a total
of 26 modules with a unique size. On the i9-9900K, running Ubuntu
18.10 with kernel version 4.18.0-17, we have a total of 12 modules
with a unique size. Table 2 shows the accuracy and performance of
Data Bounce for finding and classifying those modules.
The Strange Case of Non-Canonical Addresses. For valid ker-
nel addresses, there are no false positives with Data Bounce. Inter-
estingly, when used on a non-canonical address, i.e., an address
where the bits 47 to 63 are not all ‘0’ or ‘1’, Data Bounce reports this
address to be backed by a physical page. However, these addresses
are invalid by definition and can thus never refer to a physical
address [35]. We guess that there might be a missing check in
the store-to-load forwarding unit, which allows non-canonical ad-
dresses to enter the store buffer and be forwarded to subsequent
Table 3:Comparison ofmicroarchitectural attacks onKASLR.
Of all known attacks, Data Bounce is by far the fastest and
in contrast to all other attacks has no requirements.
Attack Time Accuracy Requirements
Hund et al. [33] 17 s 96 % -
Gruss et al. [24] 500 s N/A cache eviction
Jang et al. [43] 5ms 100 % Intel TSX
Evtyushkin et al. [12] 60ms N/A BTB reverse engineering
Data Bounce (our attack) 42µs 100 % -
loads despite not having a physical address associated. Although
the possibility of such a behaviour is documented [30], it is still
unexpected, and future work should investigate whether it could
lead to security problems.
Comparison toOther Side-Channel Attacks onKASLR.. Pre-
viousmicroarchitectural attacks onASLR relied on address-translation
caches [16, 24, 33, 43] or branch-predictor states [12, 13]. We com-
pare Data Bounce against previous attacks on kernel ASLR [12, 24,
33, 43].
Table 3 shows that our attack is the fastest attack that works on
any Intel x86 CPU. In terms of speed and accuracy, Data Bounce
is similar to the methods proposed by Jang et al. [43] and Ev-
tyushkin et al. [12]. However, one advantage of Data Bounce is
that it does not rely on CPU extensions, such as Intel TSX, or
precise knowledge of internal data structures, such as the reverse-
engineering of the branch-target buffer (BTB). In particular, the
attack by Jang et al. [43] is only applicable to selected CPUs starting
from the Haswell microarchitecture, i.e., it cannot be used on any
CPU produced earlier than 2013. Similarly, Evtyushkin et al. [12]
require knowledge of the internal workings of the branch-target
buffer, which is not known for any microarchitecture newer than
Haswell. Data Bounce works regardless of the microarchitecture,
which we have verified by successfully running it on microarchitec-
tures starting from Pentium 4 Prescott (released 2004) to Whiskey
Lake and Coffee Lake R (both released end of 2018) (cf. Table 1).
4.2 Inferring ASLR from SGX
Data Bounce does not only work for privileged addresses (cf. Sec-
tion 4.1), it also works for otherwise inaccessible addresses, such as
SGX enclaves. We demonstrate 3 different scenarios of how Data
Bounce can be used in combination with SGX.
Data Bounce from Host to Enclave. With Data Bounce, it is
possible to detect enclaves in the EPC (Enclave Page Cache), the
encrypted and inaccessible region of physical memory reserved for
Intel SGX. Consequently, we can de-randomize the virtual addresses
used by SGX enclaves.
However, this scenario is artificial, as an application has more
straightforwardmeans to determine themapped pages of its enclave.
First, applications can simply check their virtual address space
mapping, e.g., using /proc/self/maps in Linux. Second, reading
from EPC pages always returns ‘-1’ [34], thus if a virtual address
is also not part of the application, it is likely that it belongs to an
enclave. Thus, an application can simply use TSX or install a signal
handler to probe its address space for regions which return ‘-1’ to
detect enclaves.
Store-to-Leak Forwarding
For completeness, we also evaluated this scenario. In our ex-
periments, we successfully detected all pages mapped by an SGX
enclave in our application using Data Bounce. Like with KASLR
before, we had no false positives, and the accuracy was 100 %.
Data Bounce from Enclave to Host. While the host applica-
tion cannot access memory of an SGX enclave, the enclave has
full access to the virtual memory of its host. Schwarz et al. [71]
showed that this asymmetry allows building enclave malware by
overwriting the host application’s stack for mounting a return-
oriented programming exploit. One of the primitives they require
is a possibility to scan the address space for mapped pages without
crashing the enclave. While this is trivial for normal applications
using syscalls (e.g., by abusing the access syscall, or by registering
a user-space signal handler), enclaves cannot rely on such tech-
niques as they cannot execute syscalls. Thus, Schwarz et al. propose
TAP, a primitive relying on TSX to test whether an address is valid
without the risk of crashing the enclave.
The same behavior can also be achieved using Data Bounce with-
out having to rely on TSX. By leveraging speculative execution to
induce transient execution, not a single syscall is required to mount
Data Bounce. As the rdtsc instruction cannot be used inside en-
claves, we use the same counting-thread technique as Schwarz et al.
[72]. The resolution of the counting thread is high enough to mount
a Flush+Reload attack inside the enclave. In our experiments, a sim-
ple counting thread achieved 0.92 increments per cycle on a Skylake
i7-8650U, which is sufficient to mount a reliable attack.
With 290MB/s, the speed of Data Bounce in an enclave is a bit
slower than the speed of TAP [71]. The reason is that Data Bounce
requires a timer to mount a Flush+Reload attack, whereas TAP
does not require any timing or other side-channel information. Still,
Data Bounce is a viable alternative to the TSX-based approach for
detecting pages of the host application from within an SGX enclave,
in particular as many processors do not support TSX.
Data Bounce from Enclave to Enclave. Enclaves are not only
isolated from the operating system and host application, but en-
claves are also isolated from each other. Thus, Data Bounce can be
used from a (malicious) enclave to infer the address-space layout
of a different, inaccessible enclave.
We evaluated the cross-enclave ASLR break using two enclaves,
one benign and one malicious enclave, started in the same applica-
tion. Again, to get accurate timestamps for Flush+Reload, we used
a counting thread.
As the enclave-to-enclave scenario uses the same code as the
enclave-to-host scenario, we also achieve the same performance.
4.3 Breaking ASLR from JavaScript
Data Bounce cannot only be used from unprivileged native appli-
cations but also in JavaScript to break ASLR in the browser. In
this section, we evaluate the performance of Data Bounce from
JavaScript running in a modern browser. Our evaluation was done
on Google Chrome 70.0.3538.67 (64-bit) and Mozilla Firefox 66.0.2
(64-bit).
There are two main challenges for mounting Data Bounce from
JavaScript. First, there is no high-resolution timer available. There-
fore, we need to build our own timing primitive. Second, as there
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Figure 7:Data Bounce with Evict+Reload in JavaScript clearly
shows whether an address (relative to a base address) is
backed by a physical page and thus valid.
is no flush instruction in JavaScript, Flush+Reload is not possible.
Thus, we have to resort to a different covert channel for bringing
the microarchitectural state to the architectural state.
Timing Primitive. To measure timing with a high resolution,
we rely on the well-known use of a counting thread in combination
with shared memory [17, 69]. As Google Chrome has re-enabled
SharedArrayBuffers in version 671, we can use the existing im-
plementations of such a counting thread.
In Google Chrome, we can also use BigUint64Array to ensure
that the counting thread does not overflow. This improves the
measurements compared to the Uint32Array used in previous
work [17, 69] as the timestamp is increasing strictly monotonically.
In our experiments, we achieve a resolution of 50 ns in Google
Chrome, which is sufficient to distinguish a cache hit from a miss.
Covert Channel. As JavaScript does not provide a method to
flush an address from the cache, we have to resort to eviction as
shown in previous work [17, 46, 61, 69, 78]. Thus, our covert channel
from the microarchitectural to the architectural domain, i.e., the
decoding of the leaked value which is encoded into the cache, uses
Evict+Reload instead of Flush+Reload.
For the sake of simplicity, we can also just access an array which
has a size 2-3 times larger than the last-level cache to ensure that
the array is evicted from the cache. For our proof-of-concept, we
use this simple approach as it is robust and works for the attack.
While the performance increases significantly when using targeted
eviction, we would require 256 eviction sets. Building them would
be time consuming and prone to errors.
Illegal Access. In JavaScript, we cannot access an inaccessible
address architecturally. However, as JavaScript is compiled to native
code using a just-in-time compiler in all modern browsers, we can
leverage speculative execution to prevent the fault. Hence, we rely
on the same code as Kocher et al. [46] to speculatively access an out-
of-bounds index of an array. This allows to iterate over the memory
(relative from our array) and detect which pages are mapped and
which pages are not mapped.
Full Exploit. When putting everything together, we can dis-
tinguish for every location relative to the start array whether it
is backed by a physical page or not. Due to the limitations of the
JavaScript sandbox, especially due to the slow cache eviction, the
speed is orders of magnitude slower than the native implementa-
tion, as it can be seen in Figure 7. Still, we can detect whether a
1https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=821270
Schwarz et al.
virtual address is backed by a physical page within 450ms, making
Data Bounce also realistic from JavaScript.
5 FETCH+BOUNCE
While Data Bounce can already be used for powerful attacks, Fetch+
Bounce, the TLB-augmented variant of Data Bounce, allows for
even more powerful attacks as we show in this section. So far, most
microarchitectural attacks which can attack the kernel, such as
Prime+Probe [68] or DRAMA [65], require at least some knowledge
of physical addresses. Since physical address information is not
provided to unprivileged application, these attacks either require
additional side channels [23, 68] or have to blindly attack targets
until the correct target is found [72].
With Fetch+Bounce we can directly retrieve side-channel in-
formation for any target virtual address, regardless of whether it
can be accessed in the current privilege level or not. In particular,
we can detect whether a virtual address has a valid translation in
either the iTLB or dTLB. This allows an attacker to infer whether
an address was recently used.
Fetch+Bounce can attack both the iTLB and dTLB. Using Fetch+
Bounce, an attacker can detect recently accessed data pages on
the current hyperthread. Moreover, an attacker can also detect
code pages recently used for instruction execution on the current
hyperthread.
As the measurement with Fetch+Bounce results in a valid map-
ping of the target address, we also require a method to evict the
TLB. While this can be as simple as accessing (dTLB) or executing
(iTLB) data on more pages than there are entries in the TLB, this is
not an optimal strategy. Instead, we rely on the reverse-engineered
eviction strategies from Gras et al. [16].
The attack process is the following:
1 Build eviction sets for the target address(es)
2 Fetch+Bounce on the target address(es) to detect activity
3 Evict address(es) from iTLB and dTLB
4 Goto 2
In Section 5.1, we show that Fetch+Bounce allows an unprivi-
leged application to spy on TSX transactions. In Section 5.2, we
demonstrate an attack on the Linux kernel using Fetch+Bounce.
5.1 Breaking the TSX Atomicity
Intel TSX guarantees the atomicity of all instructions and data ac-
cesses which are executed inside a TSX transaction. Thus, Intel TSX
has been proposed as a security mechanism against side-channel
attacks [21, 27].
With Fetch+Bounce, an attacker can break the atomicity of TSX
transactions by recovering the TLB state after the transaction.While
Intel TSX reverts the effect of all instructions, including the invali-
dation of modified cache lines, the TLB is not affected. Thus, Fetch+
Bounce can be used to detect which addresses are valid in the TLB,
and thus infer which addresses have been accessed within a trans-
action. We verified that this is not only possible after a successful
commit of the transaction, but also after a transaction aborted.
As a consequence, an attacker can abort a transaction at an arbi-
trary point (e.g., by causing an interrupt or a conflict in the cache)
and use Fetch+Bounce to detect which pages have been accessed
until this point in time. From that, an attacker can learn memory
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8 mouse movement keyboard mouse movement
Sampling Period
D
et
ec
tio
n target
reference
Figure 8:Mousemovement detection. Themousemovements
are clearly detected. The USB keyboard activity does not
cause more TLB hits than observed as a baseline.
access patterns, which should be invisible due to the guarantees
provided by Intel TSX.
5.2 Inferring Control Flow of the Kernel
The kernel is a valuable target for attackers, as it processes all
user inputs coming from I/O devices. Microarchitectural attacks
targeting user input directly in the kernel usually rely on Prime+
Probe [59, 61, 67, 68] and thus require knowledge of physical ad-
dresses.
With Fetch+Bounce, we do not require knowledge of physical
addresses to spy on the kernel. In the following, we show that
Fetch+Bounce can spy on any type of kernel activity. We illustrate
this with the examples of mouse input and Bluetooth events.
As a simple proof of concept we monitor the first 8 pages of a
target kernel module. To obtain a baseline for the general kernel
activity, and thus the TLB activity for kernel pages, we also monitor
one reference page from a kernel module that is rarely used (in
our case i2c_i801). By comparing the activity on the 8 pages of
the kernel module to the baseline, we can determine whether the
kernel module is currently actively used or not. To get the best
results we use Fetch+Bounce with both the iTLB and dTLB. This
makes the attack independent of the type of activity in the kernel
module, i.e., there is no difference if code is executed or data is
accessed. Our spy changes its hyperthread after each Fetch+Bounce
measurement. This reduces the attack’s resolution, but allows it
to detect activity on all hyperthreads. For further processing, we
sum the resulting TLB hits over a sampling period which consists
of 5000 measurements, and then apply a basic detection filter to
this sum: We calculate the ratio of hits on the target pages and the
reference page. If the number of hits on the target pages is above
a sanity lower bound and more importantly, above the number of
cache hits on the reference page, i.e., above the baseline, then, the
page was recently used (cf. Figure 9b).
Detecting User Input. We now investigate how well Fetch+
Bounce works for spying on input-handling code in the kernel.
While Schwarz et al. [68] attacked the kernel code for PS/2 key-
boards and laptops, we target the kernel module for USB human-
interface devices. This has the advantage that we can attack input
from a large variety of modern USB input devices.
We first locate the kernel module using Data Bounce as described
in Section 4.1. With 12 pages (kernel 4.15.0), the kernel module
does not have a unique size among all modules but is one of only 3.
Thus, we can either try to identify the correct module or monitor
all of them.
Store-to-Leak Forwarding
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Figure 9: Detecting Bluetooth events by monitoring TLB hits
via Fetch+Bounce on pages at the start of the bluetooth ker-
nel module.
Figure 8 shows the results of using Fetch+Bounce on a page of
the usbhid kernel module. It can be clearly seen that mouse move-
ment results in a higher number of TLB hits. USB keyboard input,
however, seems to fall below the detection threshold with our sim-
ple method. Given this attack’s low temporal resolution, repeated
accesses to a page are necessary for clear detection. Previous work
has shown that such an event trace can be used to infer user input,
e.g., URLs [51, 61].
Detecting Bluetooth Events. Bluetooth events can give valu-
able information about the user’s presence at the computer, e.g.,
connecting (or disconnecting) a device usually requires some form
of user interaction. Tools, such as Dynamic Lock on Windows
10 [58], use connect and disconnect events to unlock and lock a
computer automatically. Thus, these events are apparently a useful
indicator to detect whether the user is currently using the computer.
Also, it is useful to monitor these events as a trigger signal for UI
redressing attacks.
To spy on these events, we first locate the Bluetooth kernel
module using Data Bounce. As the Bluetooth module is rather large
(134 pages on kernel 4.15.0) and has a unique size, it is easy to
distinguish it from other kernel modules.
Figure 9 shows a Fetch+Bounce trace while generating Bluetooth
events. While there is a constant noise floor due to TLB collisions
(Figure 9a), we can see a clear increase in TLB hits on the target
address for every Bluetooth event. After applying our detection
filter, we can detect events such as connecting and playing audio
over the Bluetooth connection with a high accuracy (Figure 9b).
Our results indicate that the precision of the detection and dis-
tinction of events with Fetch+Bounce can be significantly improved.
Future work should investigate profiling code pages of kernel mod-
ules, similar to previous template attacks [26].
6 LEAKING KERNEL MEMORY
In this section, we present Speculative Fetch+Bounce, a novel covert
channel to leak memory using Spectre. Most Spectre attacks, includ-
ing the original Spectre attack, use the cache as a covert channel
1 if ( index < bounds )
2 y = oracle[ data[index] * 4096 ];
Listing 1: A simple Spectre-PHT gadget, which allows spec-
ulative access of data out of bounds and encodes the value
in oracle.
to encode values leaked from the kernel [9, 32, 45, 46, 48, 56, 60,
70]. Other covert channels for Spectre attacks, such as port con-
tention [6] or AVX [70] have since been presented. However, it
is unclear how commonly such gadgets can be found and can be
exploited in real-world software.
With Speculative Fetch+Bounce, we show how the TLB effects
on the store buffer (cf. Section 5) can be combined with speculative
execution to leak kernel data.We show that any cache-based Spectre
gadget can be used for Speculative Fetch+Bounce. As the secret-
dependent page access also populates the TLB, such a gadget also
encodes the information in the TLB. With Data Bounce, we can
then reconstruct which of the pages was accessed and thus infer
the secret.
While at first, the improvements over the original Spectre attack
might not be obvious, there are 2 huge advantages.
Advantage 1: It requires less control over the Spectre gadget.
First, for Speculative Fetch+Bounce, an attacker requires less control
over the Spectre gadget. In a Spectre-PHT (aka Spectre Variant 1)
attack, a gadget similar to the one illustrated in Listing 1 is required.
There, an attacker requires full control over index, and also certain
control over oracle. Specifically, the base address of oracle has to
point to user-accessible memory which is shared between attacker
and victim. Furthermore, the base address has to either be known
or be controlled by the attacker. This limitation potentially reduces
the number of exploitable gadgets.
Advantage 2: It requires no shared memory. Second, with
Speculative Fetch+Bounce, we get rid of the shared-memory re-
quirement. Especially on modern operating systems, shared mem-
ory is a limitation, as these operating systems provide stronger
kernel isolation [22]. On such systems, only a few pages are mapped
both in user and kernel space, and they are typically inaccessible
from the user space. Moreover, the kernel can typically not ac-
cess user space memory due to supervisor mode access prevention
(SMAP). Hence, realistic Spectre attacks have to resort to Prime+
Probe [76]. However, Prime+Probe requires knowledge of physical
addresses, which is not exposed on modern operating systems.
With Speculative Fetch+Bounce, it is not necessary to have a
memory region which is user accessible and shared between user
and kernel space. For Speculative Fetch+Bounce, it is sufficient that
the base address of oracle points to a kernel address which is
also mapped in user space. Even in the case of KPTI [55], there
are still kernel pages mapped in the user space. On kernel 4.15.0,
we identified 65536 such kernel pages (i.e., 256MB) when KPTI
is enabled, and multiple gigabytes when KPTI is disabled. Hence,
oracle only has to point to any such range of mapped pages. Thus,
we expect that there are simpler Specter gadgets which are sufficient
to mount this attack.
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6.1 Leaking Data
To evaluate Speculative Fetch+Bounce, we use a custom ioctl
in the Linux kernel containing a Spectre gadget as illustrated in
Listing 1. The oracle array points to a kernel address which is also
mapped in the user space but not user accessible. Furthermore, we
can control index from user space, i.e., it is provided as an argument
to the ioctl.
By first providing in-bounds values for index, we mistrain the
branch predictor in the kernel in-place [8]. Then, by providing an
out-of-bounds value for index, the gadget encodes the speculatively
accessed value in the TLB. Finally, in user space, we useData Bounce
to detect which kernel page of oracle has a valid TLB entry. The
TLB entry directly depends on the secret leaked from the kernel.
We cannot ensure that speculative execution always misspecu-
lates, hence, we have to re-run Speculative Fetch+Bounce multiple
times per byte to leak. As with Fetch+Bounce (cf. Section 5), this
again requires TLB eviction after every run of Speculative Fetch+
Bounce. With this approach, we can reliably leak data from the
kernel in the same way and with the same efficiency as in the orig-
inal Spectre attack [46]. However, we reduced the requirements for
an attacker significantly, as our approach also works with active
SMAP and there is no need for shared memory.
7 DISCUSSION & RELATEDWORK
With Data Bounce, we demonstrate a powerful side-channel attack
to detect whether a virtual address has a valid mapping by exploit-
ing store-to-load forwarding.While similar attacks are known,Data
Bounce is both the most reliable and fastest attack so far. The attack
which comes closest in terms of reliability and performance is the
TSX-based attack by Jang et al. [43]. However, TSX is only sup-
ported by 34% of the Core CPUs and 43% of the Xeon CPUs released
since 2013, which are currently available for sale [66]. Data Bounce
does work both with and without TSX. When leveraging TSX for
Data Bounce, the performance increases by factor 4 which even
outperforms Jang et al. [43]. The F1-score, i.e., both precision and
recall, are not affected regardless of whether TSX is used or not. As
a result, Data Bounce is applicable to a much wider range of CPUs,
and also in restricted environments such as JavaScript. Thus, Data
Bounce can also be used in similar scenarios as the JavaScript-based
ASLR break by Gras et al. [18].
Gras et al. [16] demonstrated that sharing the TLB across hyper-
threads enables eviction-based attacks on the TLB. However, this
attack requires to first reverse engineer the TLB for building pre-
cise eviction sets of the target mapping. Fetch+Bounce is a similar
side-channel attack but does not require knowledge of TLB sets.
Fetch+Bounce works directly with the virtual address of the target
mapping, thus reducing the noise of addresses mapping to the same
set in the TLB. On a high level, Gras et al. [16] showed a Prime+
Probe-type attack on the TLB, whereas we show a more precise
Evict+Reload-type attack on the TLB.
With Speculative Fetch+Bounce, we show a fast and practical
covert channel for Spectre attacks which can replace Flush+Reload
in certain scenarios. While other covert channels have been pro-
posed [6, 45, 70, 76], Flush+Reload is still the most reliable covert
channel. As Speculative Fetch+Bounce can exploit the same gad-
gets, and gadgets with fewer requirements, we already know from
previous work that such real-world gadgets exist and have been
exploitable in the wild [46]. In line with previous Spectre papers,
finding new gadgets is an orthogonal problem and thus is not dis-
cussed in this paper.
Although the information leakage is caused by the hardware,
countermeasures against Data Bounce are possible. The basic idea
is to not have different security domains in the same address space.
Since Meltdown, KAISER [22] was deployed on all modern operat-
ing systems to ensure that the kernel is not mounted in the user’s
address space. This does not only prevent Meltdown but also side-
channel attacks on kernel addresses [24, 33, 43] including Data
Bounce, Fetch+Bounce, and Speculative Fetch+Bounce. Thus, we
suggest to unconditionally enable this countermeasure even if the
CPU reports that it is not affected by Meltdown. Additionally, we
propose to apply the same principle to SGX and sandboxes, similar
to site isolation [75]. In general, future hardware and software de-
signs should ensure that different security domains are not shared
in the same address space to reduce the attack surface.
While preventing the attacks is possible, detecting the attacks
is significantly harder. Depending on the implementation, Data
Bounce does not require any operating-system interaction at all.
For example, when implemented using speculative execution for
exception prevention, no syscall is required, and architecturally, no
exception is triggered. Thus, Data Bounce is completely invisible to
the operating system. Several works suggested relying on perfor-
mance counters to detect ongoing side-channel attacks [10, 25, 29,
40, 63, 86], e.g., by detecting an anomaly in cache misses. However,
it is unclear how such detection mechanisms perform in real-world
scenarios. Especially for the KASLR break, where the total runtime
is only 42 µs, it is questionable whether this is detectable among
the average system noise. It is even more questionable whether the
system could in time respond to a potential ongoing attack.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we demonstratedData Bounce, a Meltdown-like attack
on recent patched CPUs. We showed that correct store-to-load
forwarding via the store buffer introduces potent channels to leak
data and meta data. We showed that we can break KASLR on fully
patched machines in 42 µs. We demonstrated using the same side
channel to also reveal the address space of Intel SGX enclaves, and
break ASLR from JavaScript. In combination with TLB state changes
we were able to break the atomicity of TSX as well as monitor the
control flow of the kernel. Finally, we found that Spectre v1 gadgets
can also be exploited usingData Bounce. We showed that this allows
us to leak arbitrary kernel memory in realistic scenarios.
Ourwork shows that the hardware fixes forMeltdown inWhiskey
Lake and Coffe Lake CPUs are clearly not sufficient. We conclude
that software-based isolation of user and kernel space should re-
main enabled even on the most recent processor generations.
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